Political Constituencies In Arab World

An examination of the surface of the Arab political reality might reveal a progress of the grassroots attitude towards democracy. Indeed, the desire for democracy is more present in the Arab world than ever before: calls for more open political systems, increased protection of human rights, and broader personal liberties become increasingly frequent and are shifting the nature of political discourse. Nonetheless, all these improvements only denote an abstract aspiration towards democratization- the palpable reality points to a flagrant lack of organized, broad-based constituencies with the capacity to counterweigh authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes.

This article will tackle one of the vectors that can potentially engender or contribute to bringing about a genuine process of democratization: the bottom-up pressure. Alongside the other two vectors, the top-down approach and the external influence (whose weight will be assessed in the subsequent chapters), this constitutes an essential element if popular will is to be channeled and articulated so that it truly delegates its representatives.
Admittedly, history did record unfortunate cases of popular constituencies with non-democratic goals (such as the Nazi party) – the results have been disastrous. A second risk is posed by the habitual cycles of opening and repression that semi-authoritarian regimes resort to. In this case, the emergence of broad-based organizations might actually “revamp the institutions of control ” and result in an exacerbation of suppression of the dissidents. Yet in spite of these two caveats, there is no denying to the fact that if a consistent democratic transition is to be initiated, popular participation must be at least one of its engines. If domestic constituencies fail to exert pressure from below, attempts to alter the nature of the semi-authoritarian regimes are bound to fail.

The problem that underlies the Arab political environment is the fact that the badly needed constituencies either take the form of parties of the establishment that build their following on patronage principles or Islamist parties that base their mobilization on faith. The latter constitute a special case, since in most Middle Eastern countries they enjoy the broadest support within the society.
On the other hand, given the fact tat they are in a position in which they need to reconcile the citizen’s right with God-given truths, Islamist parties are ambivalent in what regards democracy. As Ottaway noted, “democracy is good as long as it does not lead to choices that go against Sharia. .” A more ample discussion about Islamists’ “dance around democracy ” will be developed in the second part of this paper. What needs to be stressed at this level is that, both as a result of them managing to provide certain social services that the state fails to secure, and due to their religiously emotional appeal, Islamist organizations enjoy ascendancy in terms of popular support.

In what regards the leverage that educated elites have, their modus operandi is far from garnering broad support. Two are the factors that impede them to reach out to the population at large: one pertains to the structural constraints, i.e. the rule by law previously explicated that are thus designed so as to keep these organizations impotent; the second one has to do with the gap that exists in practical terms between these elites and the rest of the society. As a point of fact, democratic elites tend to think that democracy can only come from the top, and therefore turn into advocates of gradual reform undertaken by open-minded political leaders. This, alongside the fact that the organizations they lead are confined within the boundaries of a small world has led scholars to conclude that “for the intellectual elite democratic aspirations turn into a wait for deliverance. ”

Delving even deeper, one might wonder why is it that the “Arab street belongs more to Islamic preachers than to democracy activists”, in spite of the grassroots, though, abstract fervor towards democratic values. The answer may be striking in its simplicity and pragmatism: organizations seeking to muster popular support need to develop not around abstract democratic ideals, but around palpable issues and ideologies that extract a direct emotional appeal. A parallel needs to be drawn: between intellectual elites isolated in their “cocoon” of conceptual democracy and failing to reach down to the ordinary people on the one hand, and Islamist organizations that permeate society both with their pro-active social programs and with their faith-based discourse it can only follow that the latter will prevail.

This is also a function of another link: that between democracy and economic prosperity. To elaborate, democracy does not promise concrete policy outcomes, nor does it tap into people’s emotions. As Ottaway observed, “the right to work and the right to safe housing are much more difficult to turn into reality than the right to vote and the right to assembly .” While democratic values pertain to the “first generation rights”, those that are more immediately relevant for the population of countries with stagnant economies are the so-called “economic and social rights.” Naturally, the discussion about the bearing of economic level on the nature of the political system is much more complex. Yet the link delineated above does serve well in providing a systemic explanation for the current lack of success of democratic ideals in mobilizing grassroots support.

The two levels of this analysis – the erroneous course of action undertaken by democracy activists and the inherent setbacks of lofty democratic ideals when anchored in a deprived reality – combine to give an explanation of the status quo of political constituencies in the Arab world. The prolongation of this assessment will be the survey, as follows, of the composition of Middle Eastern civil society. Therefore, by the end of this chapter I will be able to draw conclusions regarding the channels through which the Arab population can manifest its will, vent its dissatisfaction and use its right to freely participate in the life of the polity. By observing how obstructed these channels are, I will then have the instruments to assess the extent to which external influence can indeed make a difference in countries with a severely disenfranchised population.